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Abstract
We address bootstrapping secure multicast in enterprise and public-safety settings. Our work
is motivated by the fact that secure multicast has important applications in such settings, and that
the application setting significantly influences the design of security systems and protocols.
This document presents and analyzes two designs for the composition of the authentication
protocol, Kerberos, and the key transport protocol, Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY). The
two designs are denoted to be KM1 and KM2. The main aspect in which the objective impacts
the design is the assumption of an additional trusted third party (called a Key Server) that is the
final arbiter on whether a principal is authorized to receive a key.
Secure composition can be a challenge, and therefore the designs were kept to be simple so
they have intuitive appeal. Notwithstanding this, it was recognized that even simple, seemingly
secure protocols can have flaws. Two main security properties of interest called safety and avail-
ability were articulated. A rigorous analysis of KM1 and KM2 was conducted using Protocol
Composition Logic (PCL), a symbolic approach to analyzing security protocols, to show that the
designs have those properties.
The value of the analysis is demonstrated by a possible weakness in KM1 that was discovered
which lead to the design of KM2. A prototype of KM1 and KM2 was implemented starting with
the publicly available reference implementation of Kerberos, and an open-source implementation
of MIKEY. This document also discusses the experience from the implementation, and present
empirical results which demonstrate the inherent trade-off between security and performance in
the design of KM1 and KM2.
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Multimedia group communication is becoming a common channel for everyday work within
enterprises and institutes. Protecting the privacy and confidentiality of its content is paramount
in network security.
In group communication, two or more principals (e.g., humans or IP addresses) form an entity
called a group. When the principals communicate in the context of the group, anything trans-
mitted by a member of the group is received by all others in the group. Group communication,
and its underlying technology, multicast, have important applications in both Internet-scale, and
enterprise and public-safety settings.
In this document’s context, bootstrapping is the transport of an initial cryptographic key
which can be used to secure future communications, including the transport of other keys. Group
key management protocols are examples of security protocols that allow the establishment of
keying materials that can be used by its underlying transport layer’s encryption mechanism.
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This essentially is what the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)’s multicast security work-
ing group (MSec) [20] calls a registration protocol [4, 16]. Its intent is to transport an initial
cryptographic key to authorized members of a group so they can then communicate securely
with other members of the group. All members of the group possess this key. However, the
process of bootstrapping for such a protocol or system is not always trivial. This thesis attempts
to address this problem.
1.2 Contributions
The contribution of this thesis are the two possible designs of bootstrapping for secure group
communication in the enterprise and public-safety settings. Both designs were rigorously an-
alyzed and validated through prototype implementation. There is extensive prior work on au-
thenticated key agreement and transport and also considerable work on group key transport and
agreement (related work will be discussed in Section 7). However, prior work typically designs
new protocols “from scratch.” The designs proposed in this thesis instead leverages existing de
facto standard protocols, and ones that are deployed widely, which is arguably more realistic.
Also, discussion of the implementation will be provided. The starting points for the imple-
mentation are the publicly available reference implementation of Kerberos [26] and an open-
source implementation of MIKEY [25] . Empirical results will be presented based on the im-
plementation that demonstrate the inherent trade-offs between security and performance in the
designs. Additionally, the implementation using open-sourced software libraries will provide
insights in how existing systems can adapt to the protocol proposed.
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1.3 Design Overview
Kerberos [29] was adopted as the authentication protocol as it is the de facto standard for authen-
tication in enterprise and public-safety settings. Kerberos is a protocol for centralized authenti-
cation. It was based originally on a well-known authentication protocol with a trusted third-party
[28]. Kerberos will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.1.
Multimedia Internet Keying or MIKEY [1] was adopted as the key transport protocol for two
reasons. One is that it is a proposed standard for key transport from the IETF. The other reason
is that an express intent of Arkko et al. [1] is for MIKEY to be useful as a registration protocol to
transport group keys as characterized by IETF MSec. Based on the findings of this thesis, there is
no prior work on how exactly this would work. This thesis addresses this gap by proposing two
ways in which a group key is transported to only authenticated and authorized group members.
Details of MIKEY that are relevant to this work will be discussed in Section 2.3.
The manner in which the objective of transporting a group key impacts the designs as there
is an assumption on the existence of a trusted third-party, separate from the authentication mech-
anism, that is the final arbiter on whether a principal is authorized to a key. In keeping with
terminology from IETF MSec, this trusted third-party is called the Group Controller and Key
Server (GCKS) [4, 16].
It can be argued that the composition presented can be used for the authenticated transport
of any key, and not just group keys. This is certainly true. However, it may be more efficient to
use other approaches in such cases, such as authenticated Diffie-Hellman [14] or the user-to-user
mode of Kerberos [29], that do not involve the additional trusted third-party, the GCKS.
3
1.4 Methodology
Compositions of the nature needed by this work can be a technical challenge [9]. Consequently,
simplicity is a design criterion in the process of composition. The intent is that this results in a
composed protocol that is amenable to intuiting desired security properties. (However, too much
simplicity, as presented in the initial design, KM1, can in itself result in security problems. This
will be discussed this in Section 4.3.)
Notwithstanding the design philosophy of simplicity, it was recognized that history is replete
with seemingly correct security protocols being broken. Therefore, it behooves the necessity
to rigorously analyze the designs. Indeed, it is such analysis that lead to the discovery of the
weakness in KM1 as forementioned. The properties of interest were expressed and analyzed
using Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) [12, 15, 32] .
There are two reasons that PCL is an appropriate choice in this context. One is that the
problem addressed is one of secure composition. Two protocol suites that exist, and that can be
shown or are widely thought to be secure, are composed into a single protocol suite. Prior work
on PCL provides constructs and terminology to characterize the kinds of compositions that the
proposed designs use. The two kinds are sequential and parallel composition [32, 33].
The other reason that PCL is a good choice is convenience. With PCL, security properties of
interest can be proved by considering the actions of honest principals only [12, 32]. The actions
of adversaries do not have to explicitly be modelled. A principal is said to be honest if it faithfully
executes the steps that correspond to a role in the protocol. In the proofs, it was shown that honest
principals send out “safe” messages only. Roy et al. [32] provide a precise characterization of
safe messages; informally, a message is safe if any data that is to be kept secret that appears as
part of the message is protected by a cryptographic key that is a member of a set of keys that was
initially prescribed. Once it can be shown that honest principals send out safe messages only,
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there is no longer a need to explicitly model adversaries. This can then be the basis for proving
other security properties of interest.
To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed design, an implementation of the protocol
using publicly available third-party libraries. This also allows the collection of empirical mea-
surements that will be used for efficiency and performance analysis.
1.5 Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In the next section, details of IETF Msec,
Kerberos, MIKEY and Protocol Composition Logic that are relevant will be discussed. Section
3 will present the proposed protocol, KM1 and KM2. Section 4, discusses the analysis of KM1
and KM2 using PCL. This also includes a possible weakness in KM1 that KM2 does not have,
and as associated trade-off in the total number of keys for each design. Section 5 discusses the
implementation of KM1 and KM2. Also, some empirical results will be presented based on the






This section will provide a limited discussion on Kerberos. Reader should be referred to Neuman
et al. [29] for a more comprehensive treatment.
Kerberos [29] is a protocol for centralized authentication. By centralized, it means that it re-
lies on a trusted third-party. Its original design was based on the work of Needham and Schroeder
[28]. It has since been changed to incorporate other advances, such as the work of Denning and
Sacco [13]. It is a de facto standard for authentication in enterprise and public-safety settings
[23].
In Figure 2.1, the Kerberos protocol and its participants are shown. C is a client that seeks to
authenticate itself, and prove this to a server S, from whom it seeks some service. KAS is the
Kerberos Authentication Server that is able to accept and validate C’s credentials. TGS is the
Ticket Granting Server that hands out authentication tokens called tickets. The KAS and TGS

















Figure 2.1: The Kerberos authentication protocol. Step 6 is shown dotted as it is optional. Steps
1–2 are used by C to authenticate itself to the KAS and acquire a ticket granting ticket, TGT
. Steps 3–4 are used by C to leverage the TGT to authenticate itself to the TGS and acquire a
ticket, TKT . Step 5 is used by C to leverage TKT and authenticate itself to S. Step 6 is used
to authenticate S to C.
as a Key Distribution Center (KDC). S relies on the KAS and TGS to have authenticated C. C
demonstrates this to S by presenting a valid ticket issued by the TGS.
The details of Steps 1–4 are not important to the work in this thesis. However, it is assumed
that the KAS and TGS successfully authenticate C, and provide it with a valid ticket to contact
S in those steps. That assumption is well-founded — these properties have been established for
Kerberos in prior work [6, 8, 32]. Furthermore, the longevity of Kerberos gives confidence that
it is a sound protocol for authentication [23].
In Step 5, C sends the following AP REQ message to S.
AP REQ: AUTH C,S, {TKT}KS
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AUTH C,S = {S,C, T}KC,S
TKT = C, S, T,Lifetime,KC,S
TKT is the ticket issued by TGS in Step 4. It is encrypted with KS , the long-term key known to
S and TGS only, and is therefore intended to be opaque to C. AUTH is called an authenticator;
it is constructed by C. S validates the contents of AUTH against the contents of TKT . T is a
timestamp, Lifetime indicates the validity of the ticket, and KC,S is a session key generated by
TGS for use by C and S.
In Step 6, S may optionally authenticate itself to C. This message is called AP REP. its for-
mat is not shown as the protocol uses a different AP REP in KM from what is used in Kerberos
(see Section 3).
2.2 IETF MSec
Multicast enables group communication and an example of an associated group security archi-
tecture is the Multicast Group Security Architecture. The architecture is discussed by Hardjono
and Weis [16] and Baugher et al. [4]. This document will refer the architecture as “IETF MSec.”
While the focus of IETF MSec appears to be Internet-scale settings, it can be argued that it is
also applicable in enterprise and public-safety settings. Furthermore, based on the knowledge at
the creation of this document, there is no alternative that is as widely accepted.
A comprehensive discussion of IETF MSec is beyond the scope of this document. Figure 2.2,
shows its main components and processes. The focus of IETF MSec is a cryptographic approach
to securing multicast. There are several cryptographic keys that a client needs to acquire before it
is able to communicate as part of a group. These keys are derived or transported with protection












Figure 2.2: IETF Msec. This figure is adapted from Baugher et al. [4]. Our focus is the registra-
tion protocol.
multicast, the focus is the transport of this initial key for the group; called the “group key”, where
KG denotes the group key of the group G along with the Group Security Associations (GSA). In
the context of IETF MSec, a Security Association usually contains the following attributes:
• selectors, such as source and destination transport addresses.
• properties, such as an security parameter index (SPI) or cookie pair, and identities.
• cryptographic policy, such as the algorithms, modes, key lifetimes, and key lengths used
for authentication or confidentiality.
• keys, such as authentication, encryption and signing keys.
A client acquires KG using what IETF MSec calls a registration protocol with an entity that
it calls the Group Controller and Key Server (GCKS) (see Figure 2.2). The GCKS “represents
9
the entity and functions relating to the issuance and management of cryptographic keys used
by a multicast group” [16]. Once the client acquires KG, it is able to communicate with the
others in the group. The GCKS entity is responsible in accessing the policy and authorization
infrastructures to determine how it should handle client requests.
The following are the aspects and components of IETF MSec that are relevant to this work.
• Whether a client is authorized to a group. This is enforced by the GCKS. The policy that
underlies such client authorization is beyond the scope of this thesis. For the purposes
of this thesis, authorization is modelled at the level of abstraction that a client is either
authorized or is not authorized to a group at a given instant.
In the context of bootstrapping with Kerberos, the division of authority between Kerberos
and components of IETF MSec needs to be considered. One of the main design choices
that was made was to ensure that the GCKS is the final arbiter on authorization to groups,
as is required by IETF MSec. Consequently, this also is an aspect from IETF MSec that
was captured in the proposed designs.
• The goal is to transport KG. It is acquired by a client as a consequence of running the
registration or re-registration protocol. In the context of this work, the problem of boot-
strapping multicast is the problem of transporting KG to a client that is authorized to be a
member of a group.
2.3 Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)
MIKEY [1] is an IETF proposed standard protocol for the transport of cryptographic keys. Two
of MIKEY’s design goals make it a particularly good choice as the key transport protocol to use
in bootstrapping secure multicast.
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One is that MIKEY is intended to be lightweight. Indeed, the default in the pre-shared key
mode of MIKEY is to transport a key in a single round of protocol communication. The second
design aspect of MIKEY that makes it a good fit for us is that one of its explicit intents is to be
useful for key transport as part of the registration protocol in IETF MSec. However, how exactly
MIKEY should be used as part of IETF MSec has, not been specified prior to this work. KM1
and KM2 can be seen as two proposals for how this should happen.
In the remainder of this section, only details of MIKEY that are relevant to this work will be
presented. Both designs focuses on MIKEY’s pre-shared key mode; however, KM is compatible
with its other modes as well. MIKEY’s other modes are public-key and Diffie-Hellman [1].
MIKEY defines two roles for its participants: Initiator and Responder. The Initiator has a
key that it wants to transport to the Responder. When used in the pre-shared key mode, MIKEY
assumes that the Initiator and Responder share a symmetric key with which the MIKEY payload
can be protected. This key is different from the key that is to be transported.
The goal of MIKEY is to deliver sufficient keying materials for the Responder to derive the
Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) , the key used for the multimedia traffic encryption. This includes
the encrypted TEK Generation Key (TGK) along with other security policies as parameters to
generate the TEK.
The Initiator initiates communication by sending what Arkko et al.[1] call an I MESSAGE,
whose format is the following.
I MESSAGE: HDR, T,RAND, [IDi], [IDr], {SP},KEMAC
KEMAC: E(pre-shared key, {TGK})||MAC
In the above message, [·] indicates an optional component of the message, E(k,m) indicates
the encryption of message m using key k, || denotes concatenation and {·} indicates zero or
11
more occurrences of the component. The HDR is called a general MIKEY header. It is used
to transport data such as the version number of MIKEY that is being used, and an identifier for
the message. It is also used to communicate some other important information, such as what
pseudo-random function is to be used to generate keys, and whether the Initiator expects the
Responder to send a response. T is a timestamp; MIKEY relies on synchronized clocks to detect
replay. This is one of the design choices that makes MIKEY lightweight.
RAND is a random seed for key generation. IDi is the identity of the Initiator, and IDr is
the identity of the Responder. The reason they are optional is that one of the participants may
already have state regarding the other; MIKEY allows this, and accounts for it by making those
fields optional. The SP stands for “security policy.” Its intent is to communicate the policy that
the participants should use in their choices regarding security, such as the encryption algorithm to
be used. KEMAC contains the key (TGK) being transported. It is encrypted with the pre-shared
key. KEMAC also contains a Message Authentication Code (MAC) for the receiver to verify
authenticity and integrity.
The design presented in this docment use the I MESSAGE only. Therefore, other kinds of
MIKEY messages will not be discussed. Based on the findings of this work, there has been no
rigorous security analysis of MIKEY. However, it was adopted for the reasons cited at the start
of this section, and because it is a proposed standard of the IETF. Arkko et al. [1] include a
section titled “Security Considerations” as required by the IETF, in which they argue the security
of MIKEY. The proofs in this document for the security properties of KM assume the security
of MIKEY in the “safe message” sense as discussed in Section 1.4 as part of the discussions on
PCL. That is, it was assumed that if a message is safe, then transporting that message between
honest participants using MIKEY keeps that message safe.
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2.4 Protocol Composition Logic
PCL is sound in a sense that is customary in mathematical logic [12]. If a property is entailed
syntactically, then it is entailed semantically. It should be pointed out, however, that there are
known limitations in the use of PCL in proving security properties. Probably the most significant
is that it is a symbolic approach, and does not give us any assurances about the computational
difficulty that an attacker would face in compromising (an implementation of) the designs. Proofs
in PCL idealize cryptographic functions such as encryption and randomization. Nevertheless, it
can be argued that the proofs provide confidence that the designs are sound. Leveraging more
recent work that bridges the computational and symbolic approaches (see, for example, [10]) to
prove that the compositions are sound is a topic for future work.
A comprehensive description of PCL is again, beyond the scope of this document. Sufficient
background on PCL will be provided on demand so the work presented is understandable.
Security Properties There are two security properties of primary interest; they are shown in
PCL notation in Figure 2.3. These are instantiated for the designs in Propositions 1 and 2 in
Section 4.
In the figure, the group that seeks to transport the key is denoted as G, and the key associated
with it as Γ. X̂, K̂AS , T̂GS and ĜCKS are called principals in PCL. The principal X̂ is used
to represent a client that seeks to acquire a group key. The principals K̂AS and T̂GS are the
Authentication Server and Ticket Granting Server in Kerberos (see Section 2.1).
A principal instantiates a thread of execution that plays a role in a protocol. A thread that
corresponds to the principal X̂ is written as X or (X̂, η). An example of a role from this work
is in Figure 4.1. A role specifies sequential protocol operations such as “receive message,” “en-
crypt” and “send message.” In Figure 2.3, the initial condition, “For X̂ 6= . . .” specifies that it
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For X̂ 6= K̂AS ∧ X̂ 6= T̂GS ∧ X̂ 6= ĜCKS ,
Safety : ∃η.Has((X̂, η),Γ) ⊃ GroupAuth(X̂,G)
Availability : Honest(X̂) ⊃ (GroupAuth(X̂,G) ⊃ (∀η.Has((X̂, η),Γ)))
Figure 2.3: The two main security properties for KM, expressed in PCL. The safety property
asserts that if some thread of a principal X̂ has the key for the group G, then X̂ is an authorized
member of G. The availability property asserts that if X̂ is an authorized member of G then it
acquires the key for G.
does not consider cases that X̂ is one of those principals. The reason is that the K̂AS , T̂GS and
ĜCKS are trusted third-parties in the protocol. The first two are from Kerberos (see Section 2.1)
and the last is from IETF MSec [20].
In PCL, assertions involve predicates and formulas. Corresponding to each protocol action
(e.g., “encrypt with symmetric key”) is a predicate (e.g., “SymEnc.”) Such a predicate is used to
indicate that the action occurred. There may also be other predicates and formulas that do not
correspond directly to an action. None of the predicates that appears in Figure 2.3 corresponds
to a protocol action.
In the figure, the Has, Honest and GroupAuth predicates is used to express the security prop-
erties. The first two have been used extensively in prior work on PCL; the last was introduced
to express authorization to a multicast group. The Has predicate is used to indicate that a thread
possesses a particular piece of data. The Honest predicate indicates that a principal is honest; that
is, its threads faithfully follow the steps that correspond to a role in the protocol. The GroupAuth
predicate is used to indicate that a principal is authorized to a multicast group.
The safety property in Figure 2.3 expresses that if any thread of X̂ possesses the group key
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Γ, then X̂ is authorized to the group G. (The symbol “⊃” may be read informally as “implies.”)
The availability property expresses that provided X̂ is honest, if it is authorized to G, then all of
its threads possess Γ. In Propositions 1 and 2 in Section 4, the expected situation in which these
properties to hold was specified. The situation is that a thread of X̂ faithfully executes a role in
KM.
It is argued that the safety and availability properties that is articulated above are meaningful
as the main security properties of interest in the current context. Underlying the argument is the
observation that in the current context, ultimately the goal is about transporting Γ to authorized
group members. The safety and availability properties capture an “if and only if” condition – a
client should have Γ if and only if it is authorized by the GCKS to it, and its threads faithfully
play the role of a client.
We acknowledge that there may be other security considerations that are of interest beyond
the safety and availability properties. For example, the confidentiality of group memberships
may be important in some settings. Properties other than the safety and availability properties




Composition of Kerberos and MIKEY
In this section, the description is provided for KM1 (Section 3.1) and KM2 (Section 3.2). The
design criteria for KM are simplicity, efficiency and scalability. It can be argued that in each case
that the designs have adhered to the first criterion of simplicity. This is essential to the designs
since it utilizes existing standards.
Our initial approach is to consider extending the existing protocols. This is directly reflected
by the sequential composition of Kerberos and MIKEY for KM1. KM2 examines the concept of
the group entities being as Kerberos principals. This serves as an mean for authority delegation.
This also leverages the existing Kerberos principal management infrastructure to include group
management.
Efficiency and scalability will be addressed as part of the empirical assessment of the imple-











Figure 3.1: KM1 – GCKS as a Kerberos principal.
3.1 Design of KM1
• Steps 1 – 4 are the same as in Figure 2.1 with S = GCKS .
• Step 5, S = GCKS in TKT , and AUTH C,GCKS = {G,C, T}KC,GCKS , where G is the
identity of the group that C wants to join.
• Step 6 is the following MIKEY message – MIKEY-INIT: C,G, T, {KG}KC,GCKS .
KM1 is conceptually simple: GCKS is treated as the server, S, in Kerberos. Steps of KM1
are shown in Figure 3.1. Steps 1–4 are from Kerberos. Step 5 is also from Kerberos; it is the
AP REQ message (see Section 2.1) with S instantiated to GCKS in TKT , and S instantiated
to the identity of the group G whose key C seeks, in AUTH . Unlike in Kerberos, however, Step
6 is not optional. It is a MIKEY message that is used to transport the group key, Γ from the
GCKS to the client, C.
Consequently, the registration protocol from IETF MSec can be seen as Steps 5 and 6: a
sequential composition of Step 5 from Kerberos, and a new step, with MIKEY for key transport.
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The simplicity of KM1 belies an important nuance: the session. The session key, KC,GCKS ,
is used for two purposes. It is used by C to authenticate itself to the GCKS, and further by
the GCKS to authorize C to the key Γ. This is indicated by the mismatch between TKT and
AUTH; the former identifies the GCKS, and the latter, G. Even if C is not authorized to any
group, it passes the first test, that of authenticating itself to the GCKS.
An immediate consequence is a possible denial-of-service attack by unauthorized clients on
the GCKS. However, given that the scenario considered is closed enterprise and public-safety
settings, we argue that this is not a major threat. C still needs to be able to acquire a valid ticket
to authenticate itself to the GCKS.
There is still an over-reliance of KC,GCKS , however. Indeed, in Kerberos, this key is used
only to authenticate C to the server. Our observation regarding this over-reliance is related to a
possible weakness in KM1 that is discussed in Section 4.3.











Figure 3.2: KM2 – Multicast group as a Kerberos principal.
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• Steps 1 – 4 are the same as in Figure 2.1 with S = G, where G is the identity of the group
that C wants to join.
• Step 5 is the following MIKEY message – MIKEY-INIT-TGS: C,G, T, {KC,G}KG . T is
the timestamp.
• Step 6 is the following MIKEY message – MIKEY-INIT-GCKS: C,G, T, {Γ}KC,G .
• Step 7 was shown as a dotted line as there is no authentication or authorization step that
corresponds to it.
KM2 is somewhat more complex than KM1. In KM2, rather than using Kerberos for only
authentication, the GCKS delegates a portion of the authorization to groups to the TGS. How-
ever, we emphasize that in keeping with IETF MSec, the GCKS remains the final arbiter on
group authorizations.
The GCKS now no longer has a role from amongst the traditional roles in Kerberos. Rather,
the group G that C seeks to join is identified as a Kerberos principal; it is perceived as the server,
S.
Figure 3.2 shows the components and steps in KM2. As the figure indicates, Step 5 is now
communication from the TGS to the GCKS. Step 6 is communication from the GCKS to C.
Both these steps involve the transport of keys, and both use MIKEY. That is, KM2 as composing
Steps 1–4 of Kerberos with the two new steps, 5 and 6, that use MIKEY. The registration protocol
from IETF MSec corresponds to Steps 4–6.
The GCKS is shown in a dotted circle as it does not correspond to any roles in Kerberos.
The group G is shown in a solid circle as it is perceived as the server in Kerberos to which C
seeks to authenticate itself.
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The contents of the MIKEY messages in Steps 5 and 6 are shown in the caption of Figure
3.2. In Steps 3 and 4, C identifies the group G as the server to which it wants to authenticate
itself. The TGS determines whether C is authorized to G. If so, it transports KC,G to C in Step
4. This session key is intended to protect the transport of the group key Γ that is sent in Step 6
by the GCKS to C. Notwithstanding the issuance of KC,G to C by the TGS, the GCKS may
withhold the transport of Γ to C for policy reasons. In this manner, the GCKS remains the final
arbiter on group authorizations.
It may seem somewhat curious that the TGS was chosen to communicate directly with the
GCKS in Step 5. Instead, it could have been Step 5 to be communication from C to theGCKS,
with the TKT communicated by the TGS in Step 4 used by C to demonstrate to GCKS that it
is authentic. We conjecture that this alternative approach is largely equivalent to KM2. However,
it has a conceptual problem. The TKT identifies G as the server, and not GCKS. We argue that




As mention in Section 1, KM1 and KM2 has been analyzed using PCL [12, 15, 32]. Here, we
present one of our proofs that illustrates our approach. Also, the discussion of our analysis
explicates the assumption that lead us to discover the possible weakness in KM1 that is discussed
in Section 4.3.
4.1 KM1
Figure 4.1 shows KM1 expressed in PCL. There are two roles, Client and GCKS. The Client
is assumed to be composed sequentially with the client operations from Steps 1–4 of Kerberos.
We refer the reader to Roy et al. [32, 33] for an expression of those steps in PCL. As Figure 4.1
indicates, the Client first constructs the AUTH , which involves encrypting G. Ĉ. t with the key
K
Ĉ,ĜCKS
. The operation “.” is used to indicate concatenation in PCL. As mentioned in Section
1 in the context of the security properties of interest, Ĉ and ĜCKS are principals, and t is the
timestamp. The symbol “:=” is used for instantiating a variable to the left with the value to its
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Client(C, K̂AS , T̂GS , ĜCKS , t) [ GCKS(S) [
· · · Steps 1–4 of Kerberos · · ·
· · · tkt is received in Step 4 · · ·
receive tkt . encc,s
encc,s := symenc G. Ĉ. t,KĈ,ĜCKS text tkt := symdec tkt , KĜCKS
send tkt . encc,s match text tkt as Ĉ. ĜCKS . t
′. K
Ĉ,ĜCKS
text c,s := symdec encc,s, KĈ,ĜCKS
receive t. encs,c match text c,s as G. Ĉ. t
texts,c := symdec encs,c, KĈ,ĜCKS encs,c := symenc Γ, KĈ,ĜCKS
match texts,c as Γ send t. encs,c
] C ] S
Figure 4.1: KM1 expressed in PCL.
There are two roles, Client and GCKS. Some details were omitted, such as the crytographically
strong checksum used in MIKEY, which would appear in the send step of the GCKS and the
receive step of the Client.
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right.
The mnemonics symenc, send, receive, symdec and match are used to indicate oper-
ations that a thread that executes a role carries out. As their names suggest, they are used to
encrypt, send, receive, decrypt and compare strings, respectively. Each corresponds to a predi-
cate which becomes true after the action is executed. For example, once “send m” is executed
by a thread X , the predicate Send(X,m) is true.
The following proposition asserts the correctness of KM1. The symbol “`” can be read
informally as “entails.” Roles in [·]X with the subscript X identifies the thread that executes it.
Part (a) asserts that if the GCKS role is executed by a thread faithfully, then the safety property
is satisfied. Clearly, execution of the GCKS role only cannot guarantee the availability property.
Part (b) of the assertion is that if a thread executes the Client role faithfully, then the safety and
availability properties from Figure 2.3 are satisfied.
Proposition 1 The following are true.
(a) KM1 ` [GCKS]S Safety
(b) KM1 ` [Client]C Safety,Availability
We present a proof in PCL for the safety property of Part (b) in Figure 4.3. For our proof, we
need to adopt some definitions, axioms and inference rules. We show the ones that we need for
the proof we present in Figure 4.2.
Our starting premise, that is expressed in Line (13) of Figure 4.3 is that before execution
of the thread C, SafeNet(Γ,K) is true, and the safety property holds for every principal. The
predicate SafeNet is discussed extensively by Roy et al. [32, 33]. Informally, it holds if across
all threads of all principals, any occurrence of Γ is a message is protected by some key from the
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GA SymEnc(ĜCKS ,Γ, K
X̂,ĜCKS
) ⊃ GroupAuth(X̂,G) (4.1)
HON
[ ]X φ ∀ρ∈Q.∀P∈BS(ρ). φ [P ]X φ
Q ` Honest(X̂) ⊃ φ (4.2)
GI φ [a1; . . . ; an]X φ
where φ ∈ {GroupAuth(Ŷ , G),¬GroupAuth(Ŷ , G)}, (4.3)
and ∀i. ai 6= symenc Γ, K, for some K (4.4)
DSN SafeNet(s,K) ≡ ∀X. SendsSafeMsg(X, s,K) (4.5)
SAF0 ¬SafeMsg(s, s,K) (4.6)
POS SafeNet(s,K) ∧ Has(X,M) ∧ ¬SafeMsg(M, s,K) ⊃ ∃k ∈ K.Has(X, k) ∨ New(X, s)
(4.7)
KSEC Has(X,KÂ,B̂) ⊃ (X̂ = Â) ∨ (X̂ = B̂) (4.8)
ENC4 SymDec(X,E[k](m), k) ⊃ ∃Y. SymEnc(Y,m, k) (4.9)
Figure 4.2: Axioms, definitions and rules used in our proof
Used in Figure 4.3. GA and GI are new to our work and regard group authorization. KSEC can
be shown from the results of Roy et al. [32], and the remainder are from prior work [12, 32, 33].
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Premise, K = {K
Ĉ1,ĜCKS
, . . . ,K
Ĉn,ĜCKS
} Start(C) [ ]C SafeNet(Γ,K) ∧ ∀X̂.Safety (4.10)
Case 1 : Start(C) [ ]C GroupAuth(Ĉ, G) (4.11)
GI GroupAuth(Ĉ, G) [Client]C GroupAuth(Ĉ, G)
(4.12)
(14), (15) [Client]C Safety (4.13)
Case 2 : Start(C) [ ]C ¬GroupAuth(Ĉ, G) (4.14)
DSN SafeNet(Γ,K) [Client]C SafeNet(Γ,K) (4.15)
Premise [Client]C Has(C,Γ) (4.16)
SAF0 ¬SafeMsg(Γ,Γ,K) (4.17)
(13), (18), (19), (20) [Client]C SafeNet(Γ,K) ∧ Has(C,Γ)∧ (4.18)
¬SafeMsg(Γ,Γ,K)
(21),POS,¬New(C,Γ) [Client]C ∃k ∈ K.Has(C, k) (4.19)
(22),KSEC [Client]C Has(C, k) ∧ (k = KĈ,ĜCKS ) (4.20)
(23),ENC4 [Client]C ∃Y. SymEnc(Y,Γ,KĈ,ĜCKS ) (4.21)
(24),KSEC,¬SymEnc(C,Γ,K
Ĉ,ĜCKS
) [Client]C SymEnc(GCKS ,Γ,KĈ,ĜCKS ) (4.22)
GA [Client]C GroupAuth(Ĉ, G) (4.23)
(19), (26) [Client]C Safety (4.24)
Figure 4.3: Proof for the part of Assertion (b) from Proposition 1 that pertains to safety.
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set of keys K. That is, even though Γ may have been transmitted, it was done so only under the
protection of some key from K. The set K, in our context, is all the session keys issued by the
TGS for use by the client and the GCKS.
The proof is broken down into two cases. Case 1 assumes that the principal Ĉ is already
authorized to G prior to the execution of the thread C. In this case, all that is needed to show is
that GroupAuth(Ĉ, G) continues to hold after the execution of Client byC. We use the axiom GI
as the basis to infer this. The axiom asserts that the validity or invalidity of group authorization
is not affected by a sequence of actions, none of which is the encryption of Γ with some key K.
For Case 2, it is assumed that Ĉ is not authorized to G before the thread C executes. In this
case, we adopt the premise in Line (19) that after execution of Client by C, C has Γ. We then
need to show that this implies GroupAuth(Ĉ, G). We infer, in Line (21) that the conditions for
Axiom POS are met, and therefore, in Line (22) we assert that C has a key k from the set K. In
Line (23) we infer, from the axiom KSEC about Kerberos, that this key must be a session key
issued to a thread of Ĉ.
Then, in Lines (24) and (25), we infer that given that C has an encryption of Γ, some thread
must have performed the encryption. Again, KSEC allows us to infer that that thread belongs
to the principal ĜCKS . An application of the axiom GA then allows us to conclude that Ĉ is
authorized to the group G.
4.2 KM2
The two roles TGS CLIENT and TGS CLIENT in KM2 are composed in parallel. They are
both executed at the Kerberos TGS. The role TGS CLIENT transports the key KĈ,Ĝ that is
shared by the client and the group identified as the Kerberos principal Ĝ to the client. The role
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TGS CLIENT(A, Ĝ, Ĉ, t) [ TGS GCKS(B, Ĝ, Ŝ , t) [




encb,s := symenc KĈ,Ĝ,KĜ,T̂GS
enca,c := symenc Ĝ.t.KĈ,Ĝ,KĈ,T̂GS signb,s := sign (G. Ĉ. Ŝ. t. encb,s),KĜ,T̂GS
send Ĉ. tkt . enca,c mikeyb,s := G. Ĉ. Ŝ. t. encb,s. signb,s
] A send mikeyb,s
] B
CLIENT(C, Â, Ŝ , t) [ GCKS(S) [
receive tkt . enca,c receive mikeyb,s
receive mikeys,c match mikeyb,s as G. Ĉ. Ŝ. t. encb,s. signb,s
texta,c := symdec enca,c,KĈ,T̂GS verify signb,s, (G. Ĉ. Ŝ. t. encb,s), KĜ,T̂GS
match texta,c as Ĝ.t.KĈ,Ĝ textb,s := symdec encb,s, KĜ,T̂GS
match mikeys,c as G. Ĉ. Ŝ. t. encs,c. signs,c match textb,s as KĈ,Ĝ
verify signs,c, (G. Ĉ. Ŝ. t. encs,c), KĈ,Ĝ new Ktgk;
texts,c := symdec encs,c,KĈ,Ĝ encs,c := symenc Ktgk, KĈ,Ĝ
match texts,c as Ktgk signs,c := sign (G. Ĉ. Ŝ. t. encs,c), KĈ,Ĝ
] C mikeys,c := G. Ĉ. Ŝ. t. encs,c. signs,c
send mikeys,c
] S
Figure 4.4: Roles of KM2 protocol.
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TGS GCKS transports that key to the GCKS. Note that the GCKS implements the Kerberos
principal Ĝ. As in Figure 4.1, we omit some details, such as the checksum that is be used in the
message sent in TGS GCKS that uses MIKEY for key transport.
In the following proposition, we assert that KM2 has the same properties as KM1 with regards
to the security properties of interest. A difference is that for KM2, we need to make the assertion
for the TGS as well, as Step 4 is considered to be part of the registration protocol of IETF MSec.
Also, there is a parallel composition [32] of Steps 4 and 5. That is, they may occur in any order
with respect to one another. Of course, one can simply choose not to model this in PCL, and
mandate that the two steps occur in a particular order.
Proposition 2 The following are true.
(a) KM2 ` [TGS (TGS CLIENT | TGS GCKS)]S Safety
(b) KM2 ` [GCKS]S Safety
(c) KM2 ` [Client]C Safety,Availability
However, this does not capture the flexibility that no ordering needs to be imposed. In prac-
tice, not imposing an ordering may have efficiency benefits; for example, the TGS may be able
execute several instances of Step (5) in batch, and incur the cost of only a single session with the
GCKS.
The manner in which we reconcile this parallel composition is to first split the actions of the
TGS into three roles: TGS, which executes all actions of the TGS prior to the two send actions
of Steps (4) and (5), TGS CLIENT that executes the send action of Step (4) and TGS GCKS










Start(S) [TGS]S SafeNet(KĈ,Ĝ,K) (4.25)
(29)
[






encc,g := symenc Ĝ.t.KĈ,Ĝ, KĈ,T̂GS;




(31) [TGS CLIENT]S SendsSafeMsg(S,KĈ,Ĝ,K)
(4.28)
(29), (32),DSN [TGS; TGS CLIENT]S SafeNet(KĈ,Ĝ,K) (4.29)
Figure 4.5: KM2 PCL Proof for Safety property
Proof for the maintenance of the invariant we need to prove safety in KM2 by the parallel com-
position of the roles TGS CLIENT and TGS GCKS, for the role TGS CLIENT. The invariant
is SafeNet(KĈ,Ĝ,K) for K = {KĈ,T̂GS, KĜ,T̂GS}. The proof for TGS GCKS is similar.
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We then employ the parallel composition theorem of Roy et al. [32, 33]. That theorem asserts
that given two protocolsQ1 andQ2, such thatQ1 ` Ψ andQ2 ` Ψ, and Ψ ` Φ, then the parallel
composition of Q1 and Q2, Q1 | Q2 ` Φ. What we seek, then, is some property Ψ that helps us
prove our safety property. The property Ψ, in our case, is that SafeNet(KĈ,Ĝ,K) is true for K
that contains the long-term keys of principals in Kerberos (KC and KG, in particular).
We show the proof for the role TGS CLIENT in Figure 4.5. We start in Line (29) with the
premise that before execution of the role, the invariant we seek to prove holds. Then, in Lines
(30) and (31), we infer that the key KĈ,Ĝ remains safe as any message in which it is contained is
protected by a key from K. We infer in Line (32) that the role TGS CLIENT sends out KĈ,Ĝ in
safe messages only, and then we are able to conclude in Line (33) that the sequential composition
of TGS and TGS CLIENT maintains our invariant. The proof for TGS GCKS is similar, and
we are able to infer the invariant for the parallel composition as we seek.
4.3 A weakness in KM1
Our work on the proof for Proposition 1 reveals a potential weakness in KM1. Indeed, this was
our motivation for designing KM2 as an alternative.
In our work, it is assumed that the Kerberos infrastructure is secure. That is, the principals
K̂AS and T̂GS are trusted to be honest, keys are kept secret by principals that possess them, only
safe messages are sent out, and clients are authenticated correctly. However, we are sensitive to
the interface between Kerberos, and the MIKEY steps of KM that we add to Kerberos. We argue
that weaknesses that lie in this interface make the composed protocol particularly vulnerable.
The session key, K
Ĉ,ĜCKS
, is used at this interface between Kerberos and the MIKEY steps.
In KM1, KĈ,ĜCKS is used to protect all group keys to which the client is authorized. In other
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words, the security (secrecy) of all the group keys to which a client is authorized relies on the
security of K
Ĉ,ĜCKS
. We make this observation precise in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 KM1 ` ∃η.Has((X̂, η), KĈ,ĜCKS ) ⊃
(GroupAuth(Ĉ, G) ⊃ ∀γ.Has((X̂, γ),Γ))
KM2 does not have this weakness. A consequence of the partial delegation of group au-
thorization to the TGS by the GCKS is that session keys are specific to each group. The




We have implemented KM1 and KM2. The starting points for our implementations were the
open-source, reference implementation of Kerberos [26], and an open-source implementation of
MIKEY [25]. We have made our implementation available publicly as open-source [37].
We used the sample code (sclient.c and sserver.c ) delivered as part of the MITKer-
beros source package [26] as a reference to develop the Kerberos client and server code. In
the MIKEY implementation with which we started, MIKEY messages are carried as part of the
MIME payload in SIP [30]. However, we wanted our implementation to be independent of SIP.
The associations with SIP related objects were removed in the extracted MIKEY library. This
allowed us to isolate the MIKEY library from other MiniSIP source code.
The sample code demonstrates a generic test that allows a Kerberos client to acquire service
tickets and authenticate itself to a Kerberos service host. The sample applications were changed
to C++ application to easily invoke the C++ MIKEY library in the MiniSIP project [25]. Changes
made to the KDC source code are designed to be compatible with existing Kerberos clients.
For both prototypes, the client needs to pre-acquire the TGT . MITKerberos has a tool kinit
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that allows the end-user to perform this task. It performs Steps 1 and 2 of Kerberos and saves the
TGT into a cache at the client.
5.1 KM1 Prototype
The prototype for KM1 consists of two files, sclient.cxx and gcks1.cxx . The sclient is a
Kerberos client principal that attempts to contact the GCKS. The GCKS listens on a specified
TCP port for any incoming messages. The client uses the krb5_sendauth Kerberos API call to
send an authenticator to authenticate itself to the GCKS and awaits a reply.
To allow the client to indicate the multicast group, we attach this information to the krb5_-
authdata data structure as part of the credentials supplied to krb5_sendauth . This krb5_-
authdata with become part of the authenticator that is sent in the AP REQ. As a result, the
GCKS uses a modified version of the krb5_recvauth Kerberos API call, krb5_recvauth_-
gcks to allow the GCKS to directly retrieve the associated authorization data.
This method is of utilizing the authorization-data field of the authenticator is justified and is
compliant with Kerberos. The authorization data ”is optional and will only appear when addi-
tional restrictions are to be placed on the use of a ticket, beyond those carried in the ticket itself”
[29]. There are existing proposed standards that utilizes this optional field such as Kerberos
Cryptosystem Negotiation Extension [38]. Within our context, we argue that the GCKS must
know the target group to determine whether the client is authorized to that intended group.
KM1 required no code changes to the MITKerberos KDC. The GCKS implemented in gcks1.cxx
is just like any other Kerberos server from the standpoint of setup. The administrator is required
to first create a Kerberos service principal for the GCKS and generate a keytab file associated
to that principal. Then the generated keytab file needs to be transferred onto the GCKS host
33
machine.
The keytab file allows the GCKS to retrieve its own credentials. It essentially contains the
long term key KGCKS . This key is used to decrypt the ticket that contains the session key shared
between the client and the GCKS (refer to Figure 4.1). This keytab file can be created using
the local/sbin/kadmin.local executable and the ktadd [-k keytab_filename] <service
name> command [27].
5.2 KM2 Prototype
A copy of the sclient from KM1 was modified to adapt to KM2. Similarly, we have gcks2.cxx
for KM2 GCKS. Instead of using the sendauth API call, the client uses the krb5_get_credentials
MITKerberos API call. This function attempts to retrieve the session ticket credentials for the
client with a particular Kerberos service principal (multicast group) from the client’s local cache.
If the session ticket does not exist in the local cache, it will use a cached Kerberos TGT (obtained
through the kinit tool) to acquire a new session ticket.
This prototype also requires an additional KDC request flag in the TGS REQ request to notify
the Kerberos KDC to contact the GCKS. The client was modified to also wait for the GCKS’s
reply separately. However, this creates a possible race condition since the TGS REP is needed
before the message from the GCKS can be decrypted. This issue remains future work for further
investigation.
An additional KDC request flag (named KDC_OPT_MIKEY ) was added to the existing list of
KDC options for KDC request located in the MITKerberos krb5.h (global header) file. This
method of extending KDC request flag complies with the RFC [29]. The client simply performs
a bitwise OR operation with the other request flags. For example, this can be done using the
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following line of code:
krb5_flags req_flags =
AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED | KDC_OPT_MIKEY;
This allows the client to distinguish its requests to the KDC server.
On the KDC server, our code injection is placed after the TGS REQ is authenticated and
when the session key SKC,G is generated. The KDC is assumed to have a mechanism to deter-
mine the mapping of the multicast group to a specific GCKS to forward its request to. Afterwards,
the KDC will retrieve the multicast group’s private key (KG) between the TGS and the chosen
GCKS from its database. This key would have been created and dsitrbuted to the GCKS when
the multicast group principal entry was created in the KDC database.
The TGS will send the I MESSAGE encrypted byKG through its own pre-defined channel to
the delegated GCKS to forward the SKC,G. An additional payload is needed for the I MESSAGE
to indicate the client’s address and the intended multicast group. This is necessary for the GCKS
to identify the client-to-group mapping. Similarly, the second I MESSAGE encrypted by SKC,G
will carry the TGK along with the additional payload for the client to ensure the request is
properly mapped to the correct multicast group.
5.3 Confidentiality of Group Memberships
The new payload introduced in KM2 is added as an GeneralExtension MIKEY payload as sup-
ported by the original MIKEY protocol (section 6.15 [1]). This GeneralExtension payload has
integrity protection as it is included as part the calculation of the MIKEY message’s MAC.
However, some environment may require such mappings (group membership assignment)
to remain confidential. For example, we may not want to reveal the identities of agents that
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are assigned to a particular investigation even within the same institute. In such scenarios, we
recommend the payload should also be encrypted using the SKC,G. This additional encryption
step was not implemented in our prototype as it is an optional requirement and believed to have
limited impact on the overall analysis.
KM1 does not have this concern. Since the membership information is contained within
the authenticator, it is encrypted as part of its original design. No extra steps are needed to
accomplish this.
5.4 Perturbation
Both KM1 and KM2 are designed to have minimal effects on existing architecture. Apart from
administrative tasks, KM1 allows existing KDC to operate without any modifications. This is a
strong advantage over KM2. Especially in enterprise and public-safety settings, any modifica-
tions to existing systems can impose large administrative overhead. The costs and potential risk
factors involved to update all instances of master and slave servers must be carefully examined.
From a broader perspective, however, KM2 does not affect existing KDC algorithms. As
mentioned in Section 5.2, after the KDC identifies the KDC OPT MIKEY flag, it will send the
MIKEY I MESSAGE to the GCKS. If the flag is not set, the execution flow will be exactly
the same as original Kerberos. As recommended in Kerberos V5 RFC [29], the KDC should
return appropriate error message if the KDC cannot recognize certain option flags. If the system
supports this feature, the client can identify whether the server supports the KM2 protocol.
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5.5 Administrative Authority
For administrative authority, both designs has clear distinctions. KM2 requires each group to be
a Kerberos principal. Hence, the KDC administrators has authority on group creation/removal
but group membership management is still managed by the GCKS. In KM1, the GCKS has full
authority over group management. Depending on the organization’s administrative structure, this
may influence one’s preference for each design.
For an organization that requires centralized administrative control over all group manage-
ment, then the difference between KM1 and KM2 is minimal. However, for organizations that
prefer isolating multicast group management from KDC administration (notion of least priv-
ileged security design principle [35]), then KM1 is more suitable if the weakness in KM1 is
acknowledged (single point of failure, see Section 4.3).
5.6 Usability
Usability takes a predominant role in the acceptability of a security system design (or psycholog-
ical acceptability, as explained in early works by Saltzer, J.H. and Schroeder, M.D. [35]). For a
thorough analysis, a discussion is provided to show some brief insight on usability based on our
implementation experience.
Kerberos is a Single Sign-on authentication service. This means a Kerberos user is only
required to enter their secret key once so all subsequent requests are processed using the TGT.
A Kerberos client may already have a TGT in its ticket cache from previous Kerberos-related
actions (e.g. logging into a corporate account at system startup). This implies as long as there’s
a valid TGT, there will be no extra security-related steps needed for the user to initiate group
37
communication. A Kerberos-authenticated user will not be required to enter a password to access
the group communication service. This seamless experience applies to both KM1 and KM2.
As an administrator, the management of Kerberos principals is no different from the existing
mechanism. For KM1, only one extra Kerberos principal is required for the GCKS. For KM2,
the number of Kerberos principal managed is proportional to the number of groups created and
destroyed. Given that the number of groups are relatively static, the amount of administrative
work is also bound to a constant factor. The intuition is that Kerberos principals can be created
for groups prior to communication and should instead be enabled/disabled dynamically when
necessary by the GCKS, the final arbiter. We argue that the usability of the system for GCKS to
manage group member assignment or access control is out of the scope of this document as it is
recognized to be independent from our protocol’s design.
In the following section, we present some empirical results we have collected from our imple-






We ran our experiments on a 2.4GHz Intel PC with 4 GB of RAM that runs the Ubuntu Linux
operating system. The test suite used for the experiments was written in C. It involves executing
scripts that will automatically handle the creation/removal of Kerberos principals, ticket caches
and executing instances of the client and server programs (as discussed in Section 5).
There are several scenarios of interest that we examined. We consider the following as pos-
sible parameters within the context of group communication:
• Varying the number of clients in total
• Varying the number of groups
• Varying the number of clients assigned per group
• Varying group diversity
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The results are shown graphically in Figures 6.1–6.4. Each data point is a mean of as many
samples as it took for the coefficient of variation to be less than 5%. We then calculated a 95%
confidence interval. These are shown with the vertical error bars in the graphs. The reason for
computing confidence intervals is to check whether the confidence intervals overlap. If they do,
then we cannot consider the two values to be statistically distinct (with that confidence).
In all cases, the total time that it takes clients to acquire group keys for all groups to which
they are authorized was measured. This is the vertical axis. The clients attempt to acquire keys
only to those groups to which they are authorized.
6.2 Results
In Figure 6.1–6.3, 3 curves were plotted for each of KM1 and KM2. In Figure 6.4, there are 2
curves for each of KM1 and KM2.
6.2.1 Test 1: Number of clients
In Figure 6.1 we measure the relationship between the number of clients and time to acquire
keys. For one curve, there is only one group, and all clients are authorized to that group. For
another, there are three groups of which all clients are members. And for the third, 5 groups were
created in total; a client was authorized and assigned to 3 of the 5 groups uniformly at random.
In the latter two cases, each client will make three requests. The difference between those two
cases will determine whether number of groups within the database will affect the relationship
with number of clients given a constant number of groups assigned to a client.
In all 3 cases, there’s a linear relationship between the number of clients and the time re-

































Client assigned to 1 group - KM1
Client assigned to 1 group - KM2
Client assigned to 3 groups - KM1
Client assigned to 3 groups - KM2
Client assigned to 3 of 5 groups randomly - KM1
Client assigned to 3 of 5 groups randomly - KM2
Figure 6.1: Average total time to complete client requests with varying number of clients.
relationship remains the same. In fact, for KM1 when the groups assigned were multiplied by
3, the total time required also increased by the same factor. This is not the case for KM2 as the
time required increased by a greater factor. However, this relates to the impact of the number of
groups instead of clients, as explained in Section 6.2.2.
This result is as expected as the testing script was implemented to process client requests
sequentially. The only overhead that might be caused the number of clients is the lookup time
for the client’s record in the KDC database. From the results, it suggests the effects are minimal.
41




































1 client assigned to all groups - KM1
1 client assigned to all groups - KM2
5 clients assigned to all groups - KM1
5 clients assigned to all groups - KM2
10 clients assigned to all groups - KM1
10 clients assigned to all groups - KM2
Figure 6.2: Average total time to complete client requests with varying number of clients autho-
rized to groups.
In Figure 6.2, we study how the performance of KM1 and KM2 is affected by an increase in
the number of groups. As with Figure 6.1, performance is quantified as the total time it takes
all clients to acquire groups keys for all the groups to which they are authorized. 3 curves were
plotted for each of KM1 and KM2. For one curve, there was only 1 client, and this client is
authorized to all groups. For another, there were 5 clients, each of which is authorized to all
groups. And for the third, there were 10 clients, each of which is authorized to all groups.
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This graph also shows there’s a linear relationship between the number of groups and the time
taken for all the clients to be completed. However, the number of groups has a greater impact on
KM2 than KM1 as indicated by the gradient of the line.
One explanation is after a client’s first group request in KM1, all subsequent group requests
will not require the KDC’s involvement. That removes 4 out of 6 steps of the protocol. Although
KM1 theoretically has only 13 of the steps required by KM2, not all step’s computation time are
equal. Hence, the total execution time for KM1 may not be 13 of KM1. This effect is directly
related to caching mechanism of the system implemented as mentioned in Section 6.2.5.
6.2.3 Test 3: Group size
In Figure 6.3, we study performance as the size (number of members) of groups increases. As
with the prior cases, performance is measured as the total time for clients to acquire group keys.
Again, 3 curves were polotted for each of KM1 and KM2. A constant number of clients was
chosen; 50 in this case. Then uniformly at random, authorized the clients to groups to ensure a
certain size for each group. For one curve, there was one group only. For another curve, there
were 5 groups, and for the third curve there were 10 groups.
Figure 6.3 results are somewhat similar to Figure 6.2. The distinction lies again in the mag-
nitude of increase for increasing group size. Comparing Figure 6.2 with 10 clients assigned to 50
groups to Figure 6.3 with 10 groups each with 50 clients assigned, KM2 reached almost 15000ms
for Test 3 whilst it only reached 9000ms for Test 2. For KM1, it reached around 6000ms for Test
3 and less than 5000ms for Test 2.
The difference between the two cases is that in Test 2, the client’s ticket cache is reused for



































1 group - KM1
1 group - KM2
5 groups - KM1
5 groups- KM2
10 groups - KM1
10 groups - KM2
Figure 6.3: Average total time to complete client requests with varying group sizes.
client finishes their requests. Although this related directly to the implementation details of the
tests, it again demonstrates the critical impact that the ticket cache has.
6.2.4 Test 4: Group Diversity
In Figure 6.4, we plot the impact on performance of what we call “group diversity.” Intuitively,
groups are diverse when they do not share common members. For the case of an unbounded
number of clients and a constant number of groups, for example, the assignment of a client to
exactly one group results in the highest diversity. The assignment of all clients to all groups
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results in the lowest diversity.
To better illustrate the group diversity defined for our test case, Tables 6.1 and 6.2 are pre-
sented for the case where the group size is 2 and there are 5 groups. The X in the table marks
that a client is assigned to a particular group.
In the case of high group diversity, chances of client being in the same group as another client
is low. For the case of low group diversity, all the clients are assigned to the same two groups.
Table 6.1: Illustration of high group diversity
Client









Table 6.2: Illustration of low group diversity
Client









Based on Figure 6.4, it can be seen that there are no effects on group diversity. This is as
expected as the number of client requests being processed are the same. In a client’s view, it
needs to perform two group requests. Each client’s request is independent of other clients’ group
requests. Unless there’s optimization related to client lookup, there should also be no difference
on the server side. Hence, there should not be a correlation between the two.
6.2.5 Summary
We make two observations from the graphs. One is that both KM1 and KM2 scale linearly
with the number of clients, groups, group size and group diversity. This is promising for both
approaches and suggests that they will scale well for large deployments. This linear scaling was



































High group diversity - KM1
High group diversity - KM2
Low group diversity - KM1
Low group diversity - KM2
Figure 6.4: Average total time to complete client requests with varying group assignment with
fixed number of clients and groups.
infrastructure must manage and transport. In each case, the number of keys increases linearly
with each of the inputs.
The number of keys can also be used to reason about the second observation. The second
observation is that KM1 consistently outperforms KM2. This can be seen as a trade-off between
security and performance that is inherent to KM1 and KM2. In particular, KM1 has the possible
weakness that was discussed in Section 4.3 that KM2 does not have.
The implementation of Kerberos that was adopted [26] has a somewhat sophisticated caching
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mechanism. Repeated requests for the same key do not necessarily result in the same time
overhead, as the key may be in the cache. Our implementation of the GCKS is somewhat
rudimentary in that while it supports all the protocols as needed, it does not have a cache similar
to Kerberos.
While we argue that our empirical results provide meaningful insights about the scaling prop-
erties of KM1 and KM2, and their relative performance characteristics, It should be pointed out
that such implementation issues can significantly affect the results. A more comprehensive as-




We have explicitly incorporated Kerberos [29] and MIKEY [1] in our work. Therefore, those
pieces of work are closely related to ours. As we discuss them elsewhere in this document, we do
not discuss them further here. Also, we use PCL [12, 15, 32, 33] for our analysis. Consequently,
that work is related as well. We provide a limited discussion on PCL as needed elsewhere in
our document. Also, as our work does not propose new techniques for such analysis, we do not
discuss other approaches from the literature for it.
The motivation for us to consider the composition of Kerberos and MIKEY is the transport
of keys for secure group communication. There has been considerable work on authenticated
key agreement and distribution or transfer. Work that does not specifically address group keys,
such as those of Diffie et al. [14] and Bellare and Rogaway [7] is related to ours mostly in the
authentication part. We adopt Kerberos for authentication as it is the de facto standard in the
settings we consider.
There is also work that is focussed on group keys. Key agreement schemes such as the work
of Harn and Lin [17] are not similar to our work as they require group participants to contribute
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to the key. We assume that the enterprise wants control over the generation of keys. There is
also some work from IETF MSec that proposes new protocols for group key establishment for
secure multicast. Such work is different from ours in that they are designed “from scratch.” Our
work is on reusing an existing de facto and a proposed standard. Furthermore, to our knowledge,
unlike our work, no rigorous analysis has been done for such prior work. Examples of such work
are the Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) [5] and the Group Security Association and Key
Management Protocol [18]
The work of Jordan and Medina [21], is somewhat closer to ours. That work uses Kerberos
to establish group keys. We argue that the use of “pure” Kerberos, and not Kerberos per se is
less practical than what we have done. Our work is backward-compatible in settings in which
Kerberos is already used for authentication.
The work of Crescenzo and Kornievskaia [11] addresses secure multicast and Kerberos.
However, their focus is on what is called the cross-realm scenario, in which the main prob-
lem is that of an enterprise authorizing principals from another enterprise to multicast groups.
While this problem is certainly interesting, it is different from the problem that we address. Also,
they do not leverage MIKEY as we do.
There is also work on key management in the context of secure group communication.
Rafaeli and Hutchison [31] survey such work; an example is the work of Balenson et al. [3].
Such work is focussed on how the communication and key overhead can be reduced for efficient
rekeying. We do not address such issues in our work, and deal only with the initial transport of
the group key.
There has also been work on what is called “Kerberizing” applications and protocols that is
somewhat related to ours. The work of Mattsson and Tian [24], for example, Kerberizes MIKEY
by introducing new modes of operation for MIKEY. These new incorporate a ticket mechanism
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similar to that of Kerberos. Their technique can potentially be used for authenticated group key
transport. However, they do not leverage an existing Kerberos infrastructure like we do.
Other examples of such work are those of Hildrum [19], which addresses Kerberized rlogin,
and [36], which is a deployment of Kerberized ftp. Rather than Kerberizing a single application,
our work can be seen as Kerberizing a class of applications – group communication.
In this respect, our work is similar to the work on Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys
(KINK) [34]. The idea there, as the name suggests, is an approach based on Kerberos for key
agreement for IPSec. As such, it is more similar to key agreement for IPSec, such as IKE [22].
Their focus is not group keys. However, the existence of their work suggests that our perspective
on Kerberizing the transport of group keys is well-motivated.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Future Work
8.1.1 Empirical Analysis
There are a number of topics for future work in this context. One is a more comprehensive
empirical evaluation of our implementation, and a deeper study on how the GCKS can be imple-
mented to be faithful to IETF MSec, and bound more tightly to the components of Kerberos to
make the overall system more efficient. In particular, the experience and longevity of Kerberos
implementations may offer useful lessons in building portions of the GCKS.
8.1.2 PCL Analysis
There has been research on using theorem solvers to prove PCL assertions [2]. Unfortunately,
the source provided was outdated. The PCL axioms definitions needs to be updated to be com-
patible with the latest syntax of Isabelle. This work was left outside the scope of this document.
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However, if more resources are provided, leveraging theorem solvers can provide a concrete val-
idation and contribution to the analysis. More lemmas and assertions can be proven once the
protocol is formally defined.
8.1.3 Group Rekeying
The Rekeying process provides a mean to support groups with dynamic members, as specified
by IETF MSec [16]. Its purpose is to maintain key freshness when security policy adjustments
may occur or if members leave or join the session. Although MIKEY does not fully provide a
mechanism for rekeying, it can be achieved by issuing a new MIKEY I MESSAGE (as suggested
by its RFC [1]). However, this would require unicast communication from the GCKS to each
active client. There will be a linear relationship between the cost of rekey and number of clients
per group.
Further analysis is needed to determine the cost and benefit in allowing such a feature. For
scenarios where the group sessions are relatively short, then rekeying may not be necessary.
Same applies if the group members are relatively static for each session.
8.1.4 Authenticated Cross-Realm Group Communication
As menionted before in Section 7, the problem of Cross-Realm Authentication is very different
from the issue addressed by this document. However, since our design adopts Kerberos, it might
be interesting to see its effects in the case for group communication. In the context of group
communication with Cross-Realm Authentication, one can imagine the interesting problem of
allowing authenticated Kerberos clients to communicate with clients from other realms.
For KM1, this can be achieved if the GCKS is a service principal under multiple KDC. Two
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authenticated Kerberos clients from different realms can be authenticating to the same ”multi-
realm GCKS” that maps each client to the same group. This method bypasses the traditional
model with Cross-Realm KDCs requiring shared keys[29]. One might evaluate the possible
security threat this might impose. However, the same arguments can be applied to whether the
KDC should have authority over all group management as discussed in Section 5.5.
For KM2, the GCKS is tightly bound to the KDC so a trivial solution is not apparent. This
will be left as future work.
8.1.5 Alternative Methods
Another topic for future work regards other designs that may be viable alternatives to KM1 and
KM2, and a study of the properties that those new designs have that may be superior to our
designs. We allude to one such design in Section 3.2. Of course, as is our mindset in this work,
any new design must also be rigorously analyzed as part of the future work.
8.2 Conclusions
We have proposed two designs, KM1 and KM2, for bootstrapping secure multicast with Kerberos
by composing it with MIKEY [1]. Our motivation is the authenticated transport of group keys in
environments that already deploy Kerberos for authentication. Indeed, Kerberos is the de facto
standard for authentication in enterprise and public-safety settings. Our choice of protocol for
key transport is MIKEY, which is an IETF proposed standard. One of the explicit intents of
MIKEY is for it to be usable in the registration protocol of IETF MSec.
We have rigorously analyzed KM1 and KM2 using PCL. We have pointed out that the anal-
ysis was valuable to us — it revealed a possible weakness in KM1, and it is the discovery of
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this weakness that lead us to design KM2. We have also discussed an implementation of KM1
and KM2 that we have carried out, starting with the open-source reference implementation of
Kerberos, and an open-source implementation of MIKEY. We have presented empirical results
based on our implementation that demonstrate that our designs scale well with the number of
clients, groups, group size and group diversity. They also demonstrate the inherent trade-offs
between security and performance in KM1 and KM2.
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